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SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
PROPER BASICALITY*
James G. Hanink

Alvin Plantinga's account of proper basicality, which suggests a "broad foundationalism,"
raises nagging questions. A first such question is how a disposition to accept certain
beliefs as properly basic could contribute to their being so. A second is whether broad
foundationalists can really make headway in identifying the criteria of proper basicality
by using, as Plantinga suggests, an inductive approach. A third is whether members of
the set of statements that give criteria for proper basicality are (a) themselves properly
basic and (b) necessary or only contingent truths. I argue that each of these questions
has a satisfactory answer, although at Ieast one inductive approach to detennining proper
basicality fails.

Alvin Plantinga has used a concept of "proper basicality" in exploring the conditions that a proposition must meet if it is, noninferentially, to be accepted as
rational. I His account of proper basicality comes within the context of what I
call "broad foundationalism." This brand of foundationalism holds that S is
rationally justified in believing p at t if and only if either p is derivable from
beliefs that are properly basic for S or p is itself properly basic for S. It is
distinctively "broad" in that it does not limit proper basicality to beliefs that are
either self-evident or incorrigible or even evident to the senses for S at t. What
Planting a calls "classical foundationalism," on the other hand, makes just this
restriction. As an unhappy result. it both excludes from proper basicality some
beliefs that intuitively have that status and proves to be self-defeating.'
But broad foundationalism surely invites questions about what does constitute
proper basicality. Unless they are answered, broad foundationalism might seem
to suggest a certain trickery, especially if it has major theological implications. 3
There are three main questions that I want to examine here, though each of them
generates others that I cannot altogether put off. Each main question admits of
a satisfactory, if not always welcome, answer.
The first question is why, if it does, S's strong and natural disposition to
believe p at t should give any support to p's being properly basic for S at t
(hereafter temporal indices are omitted). Why should a fact about S, when p
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makes no explicit reference to S, affect p' s epistemic status? The second question
is how we should understand, and follow, Plantinga's proposal that the working
out of the conditions for proper basicality must be done inductively. Are we,
for example, to start with the actual beliefs of different epistemic communities?
The last question addresses the status of propositions that state conditions for
proper basicality. Are such propositions themselves properly basic? Are they
necessary truths? Merely contingent truths?
II

Let us begin with the first question on the agenda. How might the strong and
natural disposition to believe p help render p properly basic? Plantinga clearly
suggests that it does. Suppose someone complains that if, rejecting classical
foundationalism, we allow "God exists" to be properly basic, then we must allow
"The Great Pumpkin exists" a like status. Plantinga answers that although there
is a widespread disposition to recognize God's presence in the world, "the same
cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no Great Pumpkin and no
natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great Pumpkin."4 This theistic disposition is not an argument for God's existence. But it does satisfy one of the
conditions under which theism becomes rational. For one distinctive feature of
properly basic beliefs, it seems, is the strong disposition to accept them. It is,
apparently, a feature that serves to render such beliefs properly basic.
But an obvious objection remains. Why should one's disposition to believe
that God exists affect the epistemic status of one's belief? There are, after all,
any number of cases in which S's disposition to believe that p scarcely seems
to enhance p's epistemic status. What are we to say of the common experience
of being disposed to hold some belief, for example, that one is the best breakdancer on the block, only to have one's belief proved resoundingly false?
I will consider, in order of their increasing promise, three possible explanations
of why S's disposition to believe that p can positively affect p's epistemic status
for S. But first a clarification is in order about just how much weight we are to
give to natural dispositions. That one has a strong and natural disposition to
hold, non inferentially , a given belief could only give a prima facie support to
its proper basicality. No one claims, then, that such a disposition is a sufficient
condition for proper basicality. Still, it might be a necessary condition, at least
for one's more central basic beliefs. Consider, again, the break-dancing case.
The beliefs that lead one to give up a claim to supremacy rest on basic beliefs
about one's sensory apparatus, beliefs that one is strongly and naturally disposed
to accept. Thus, if we must often reject beliefs that we are disposed to accept,
we reject them because of beliefs that we are still more disposed to accept. Our
embarrassments are repeated, but they are also self-limiting.
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What, now, of the larger issue? How can a disposition to take p as properly
basic supportp's having that status? One answer to this query appeals to evolution 5 Its main lines are plain enough. Yes, we do accept, for the most part,
those beliefs to which we are strongly disposed. But if we were often and strongly
disposed to accept, and so did accept, beliefs which were rationally defective,
our survival chances would be disastrously lessened. And yet here we are. A
sign of evolution's blind favor is that somehow, the biological details of which
still elude us, we have become organically structured to be strongly disposed to
accept rational beliefs. Let the epistemologist take note of our good fortune!
But why suppose that this good fortune will persist? A chief problem with
"the evolutionary answer" is that evolutionary theory, by itself, cannot promise
us a continually successful correspondence between what we are disposed to
believe and what is rational to believe. Suppose, for example, that we consider
the fate of an imaginary species, NAM, during a period of rapid environmental
and technological change. At the start of this period, members of this species
are strongly disposed to hold certain beliefs. Among them is the belief that highly
aggressive behavior solves many social problems. Initially this particular belief
is, indeed, plausible. But with the rapid change in environment and technology,
such a belief soon enough no longer corresponds to reality. Now what the species
is so strongly disposed to believe is, in fact, dysfunctional. Indeed, were its
members somehow able to counteract their strong disposition to hold this belief
(and perhaps a minority of them can), it would be clear enough that the belief
at issue is positively irrational. Sadly, some of the very dispositions that once
contributed to the success of the species now threaten it with disaster.
What is the moral of this story? It is that we human beings, given certain
possible scripts, are right now in the position of this hypothetical species-and
not just with respect to our disposition to believe in the efficacy of aggressive
behavior. Many of our beliefs might be irrational despite our disposition to hold
them. Hence, it is not clear that our dispositions deserve much respect simply
because of their supposed evolutionary pedigree. If we once see that evolution
makes no promises, it hardly seems that we are justified in here and now giving
our dispositions much epistemic weight, however habituated we might be in
doing so. So the evolutionary answer, by itself, is not persuasive.
A second response to the question of how dispositions can support proper
basicality turns not on evolutionary optimism but, instead, on a kind of pragmatism. We have an epistemic obligation to increase our stock of true beliefs.
But the pursuit of truth, for humans, is not impassionate but passionate. We are
often most apt to find out true propositions if we give some assent to them even
before we put them to their respective tests. Of course, we need not test a
supposed properly basic relief to establish its initial warrant. Still, the testing of
such a candidate by-for example--checking its logical consistency with non-
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controversially basic beliefs can disqualify it. And if the belief is not even
tentatively accepted, it is unlikely that we will trouble to submit it to even this
negative test. If we are not disposed to accept a belief and it does not threaten
beliefs we do hold, then usually it is of little interest to us. We can call this
second answer "the pragmatic answer. "6 It says, in short, that the strong and
natural disposition to believe p counts toward p' s prima facie proper basicality
because it enhances our ability to determine p's truth.
There are difficulties, though, with this pragmatic answer. In the first place,
sometimes one already knows p to be true. I know, for example, that
(l) I am not now dreaming.

But if I am a broad foundationalist, I will quite likely take (1) to be properly
basic. And I will, in part, regard it as properly basic just because I am strongly
disposed to believe it. But here my strong disposition to believe (1) does not
give me an incentive to determine its truth. I already know that (1) is true. The
disposition to believe, then, cannot always be given epistemic weight because
doing so would make us more keenly pursue the truth.
A second difficulty with the pragmatic answer is its artificial and extrinsic
character. Why are dispositions important? Not, it says, because of a natural
and intrinsic tie with rationality but because they can prod us to work through
the testing processes that are so linked with rationality. Perhaps, of course, no
more can be said for human dispositions. Still, one might be pardoned for being
less than strongly disposed to believe that the link between the dispositional and
the cognitive is so tenuous.
There is, happily, a third account of why the strong and natural disposition
to believe p should give some weight to p's being properly basic. This is "the
believer's account." It is perhaps a bit less unfashionable now than in recent
memory. On this view, the human person is God's doing and in some way
reflects God. But God is simple, at least in the sense that God's powers are in
perfect unity. And if we are made in God's image, we should expect some,
albeit imperfect, convergence of our faculties. In the case at hand, we should
perhaps expect that what we are strongly and naturally disposed to believe is,
because of our being so disposed, given some epistemic status. 7
To be sure, the believer's account rests on the rationality ofreligious beliefwhich issue is a strong motivation for the interest in proper basicality. But
recognizing this connection only underscores the interrelatedness of first questions
in philosophy. Still, the non-believer will quickly dismiss the believer's account.
But unless some "better" account is given, there may be a price to pay. For
suppose, as a nonbeliever, one holds that what one is strongly disposed to believe
has a positive bearing on what is rational to believe as basic. Then one is left
to accept that link as a brute fact. And if one does not hold that there is such a
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link? Then one is left to sort out hypotheses rather like a chess computer plays
chess: in a mechanical and, ironically, a less than rational way.
III

Of course, a strong and natural disposition to believe p is doubtless only one
mark of proper basicality. (And, indeed, it might be that some whole groups
would have a strong disposition to accept a proposition as basic that others would
not. Imagine, for example, a primitive tribe that believed that the ancestors of
the ruling family had brought the world into being only a few generations ago. X)
But if we reject classical foundationalism, how are we to arrive at the other
marks of proper basicality? How, especially, are we to do so when different
groups, not to mention individuals, might disagree about what these marks are?
Plantinga proposes an inductive strategy. He claims that neither classical foundationalism's restriction on proper basicality "nor any other revealing necessary
and sufficient condition for proper basicality follows from clearly acceptable
arguments. And hence the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly
speaking, inductive."9 His proposal is both modest in goal and resigned about
its inductive base. With respect to the first point, he admits that instead of hitting
on a single necessary and sufficient condition perhaps "the best we can do here
is to give some sufficient conditions of prima facie justification. "10 With respect
to the second point, when we cast about for examples of conditions under which
beliefs are taken to be properly basic, we should keep in mind that "there is no
reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the examples."11
Plantinga does not, however, work through any sustained applications of this
inductive proposal. Nor on one important and not implausible interpretation of
it is it clear how-as a philosopher-he could. For a first response to it, based
on what we might call "the comparative interpretation," might be the following.
"Are we, then, to give up philosophy for field work? Should we set out to
interview different communities and individuals to see what the marks are, for
them, of a belief's being properly basic?" If such a plan were in the offing, the
next question would be which communities, say, we are to survey. Suppose the
answer is that at least in our initial survey we are to weigh equally all communities.
Then it seems that our field work assumes an unacceptable relativism. But what
if we poll some communities (participants, say, in world religions and advanced
scientific traditions) but not others (cultists and flat-earthers)? In this case it
seems that we are already employing a standard of epistemic responsibility. Yet
if we assume such a standard, we also abandon an inductive methodology of
simply looking to see under what conditions beliefs are taken to be properly
basic and then cataloguing these distinctive conditions. Perhaps, though, there
is a way out of what we might call "the inductivist's dilemma" that this reading
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of Plantinga's proposal suggests. 12 Perhaps, too, there is a way to salvage the
core of his inductivism. We might at least retrace our steps.
There would, of course, be no dilemma if an inductivist approach to proper
basicality did not require us to take an empirical tum, to investigate what various
groups see as the justifying marks of properly basic beliefs. Must it, then, really
require that? Perhaps, too, one could even suggest that such various groups do
not exist, unless we consider as our groups the insane, the immature, and the
normal. And this broad grouping would eliminate our empirical task. For surely
as philosophers we need not examine the noetic structures of the insane and
immature. In support of this simplifying maneuver, one might also cite the
common sense tradition. Do not Moore, and Reid before him, find it enough to
consult the plain man? Lastly, in lieu of any compelling case that human beings
are so different that the conditions under which they take a belief to be properly
basic fluctuate from group to group, the intertranslatability of languages offers
prima facie evidence for shared epistemic starting points.
But we cannot, after all, so easily escape the attractions of an empiricist and
comparative approach to the criteria of proper basicality. Planting a himself distinguishes rather finely among human epistemic communities. Thus he explicitly
recognizes the community of Christians, a distinct minority-and the justification
(albeit weak) of basic beliefs that its teaching and testimony provides to its
members. 13 He recognizes, too, the community of atheists, a still more distinct
minority. While we need not attend to differences between square-dancers and
break-dancers, we should expect a fairly wide epistemic pluralism. In their own
way, for that matter, philosophers of common sense, Reid for example, admit
that various intellectual systems easily confuse the plain man and generate intellectual groupings that cannot be ignored. And if there is an appeal to intertranslatability, we should note that it tells us far more about shared vehicles of meaning
than about shared beliefs. To this rejoinder, of course no one need add any
philosophical argument to show that as a matter of fact basic beliefs are often
not shared.
Given this epistemic pluralism, then, we return to the first hom of the dilemma.
If we take each epistemic group with equal seriousness at the outset of our polling
and if each is truly distinctive, then the result will be contradictory conditions
of proper basicality. From this it is a short step to relativism about proper
basicality, since the only way to escape the contradictions would be to relativize
statements of proper basicality conditions to specific groups. Plantinga, it is true,
insists that Christians need not accept the conditions for proper basicality given
by atheists. He also holds that just one complete set of conditions for proper
basicality is, in the end, correct. "Particularism," he says, "does not imply
subjectivism. "14 But the question here is whether "comparative" inductivism
implies relativism. For on the comparative interpretation of inductivism that we
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are exploring, what is properly basic for S seems to be left as a function of S's
group membership. Chisholm's particularist, by contrast, asks himself what he
knows hic et nunc. He does not ask what some series of groups (or individuals)
takes to be properly basic. Nor does he only then, inductively fortified, ask what
he could claim about proper basicality-always reserving a group-based veto of
awkward data in the inductive base!
To be sure, some forms of relativism are benign. There is, for example, a
sense in which what is rational for S to believe, even as basic, changes over
time. It is ordinarily rational for a three year old, but not for an adolescent, to
believe in the Easter Bunny. It is rational for an adolescent to believe that the
significance of, say, Confirmation is thus-and-so and rational for an adult to
believe that it is quite otherwise. But in using such examples one presupposes
a "correct vantage point" of rationality from which one can see the epistemic
advance made, respectively, by the adolescent over the child and the adult over
the adolescent. An inductivism that would introduce non-negotiable group standards of proper basicality is another matter. It threatens to undermine any claim
to an overriding rationality against which we could assess benignly relative
measures of rationality. So, if accepting all epistemic groups as at the outset
equally legitimate (albeit while reserving a group-based veto over all but one's
own group's examples of proper basicality) does not lead directly to an unacceptable relativism, it soon enough gets us there.
This leaves us with the other hom of the inductivist' s dilemma, unless someone
can slip between its horns. Suppose we poll only groups (or individuals) that
are close enough in their marks of proper basicality to generate largely overlapping
epistemic inventories. If we do so, we can still speak of a more or less unified
rationality. But to insure this result, have we not abandoned our original interpretation of the inductive approach? Instead of taking groups as they come, we
pre-establish standards that they must meet if they are to be taken seriously. But
is this strategy any better than a return to philosophical dogmatism? And was it
not such a dogmatism that motivated classical foundationalism?
The best answer to such worries is, I think, that a chastened dogmatism is
not so perilous as an unchecked relativism. The inductivist's dilemma does
indeed force a choice between the two. And it looks very much like the right
choice means scrapping "the comparative interpretation" of inductivism with
which we began. The legitimate inductivism with which we are left is, it seems,
one that restrains inductive analysis to the individual's own epistemic inventory.
But such an inductivism closely approaches a chastened dogmatism. Philosophical
dogmatism, moreover, need not be such a bugbear. Wrong actions, after all,
can have good motives. The wrongness of classical foundational ism should not
blind us to the merit of a sober dogmatism. As Chisholm reminds us, we know
some particular truths before we can propose tests to determine what we can or
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cannot know. How else could we justify such tests?15 So, too, I think, we just
know, when we know, that certain conditions are marks of proper basicality.
How else could we know, as we do, that some groups and individuals are
epistemically reliable and others are not? Obviously we are sometimes wrong
about particular knowledge claims. This fallibility extends to claims that under
such-and-such conditions (or only then) p is properly basic for S. The classical
foundationalists, we now see, were much too restrictive. But when we do know,
modestly, a prima facie sufficient condition for proper basicality, and clearly
p's being incorrigible for S is at least this much, we do not know it because of
some polling process or because our "group" takes it to be such.
Perhaps, however, we can save something of the comparative interpretation
of inductivism even if the inductivist's dilemma that it generates has the force
that I think it does. For one might propose the following as a plausible negative
test of one's working set of prima facie sufficient conditions for proper basicality.
If one's epistemic peers take p as properly basic even though p fails to meet any
of one's conditions for basicality, then one's set of conditions is incomplete. '6
Such a negative test does appeal to the judgments of others. Still, the "others"
are restricted in advance. And doubtless more important negative tests do not
appeal to the judgment of others. For example, the conditions for proper basicality
that one accepts must not lead one to admit, as properly basic, beliefs that imply
other beliefs that are absurd. Nor can these supposed conditions lead one to
accept, as basic, beliefs that are contradictory.
At most, though, only an echo of the comparative interpretation remains. Its
fundamental spirit should be rejected. But in favor of what? The only alternative
I see may be the real core of Plantinga's own inductivism, although I am not
sure that "inductivism" is its most perspicuous rubric.
What, then, is this alternative? It is resorting yet again to the slippery conceptual
analysis, as practiced by the reflective person, on which philosophy's precarious
fame has long turned. But what does such an analysis offer us in our present
task? How can it help us make headway in identifying the criteria of proper
basicality? The answer, I think, is that it is only by the analysis of one's own
noetic structure that one can achieve progress in identifying the criteria of proper
basicality. And even then, one can do so only if one has, as a reflective person,
the capacity to carry out this analysis carefully and insightfully. Indeed, we must
assume that the "reflective person" one strives to be embodies a regulative
epistemic ideal. (Otherwise the problem of relativism re-emerges, for the marks
of basicality recognized by epistemically imperceptive individuals are no more
consistent or interesting than those recognized by epistemically unreliable
groups.) But if we have any hope of real success in philosophy, we must make
some such assumption of epistemic insight anyway.
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IV

Whatever their method for arriving at the probably modest criteria for proper
basicality, broad foundationalists face the further question of how to characterize
statements of these criteria. Consider, for example, a statement like
(2) C is a criterion for the proper basicality of p for S.
What general epistemic and logical status might we expect instances of (2) to
have?
Suppose S* is the set of truths that are instances of (2). Suppose, too, that
the conditions for proper basicality are relative not to this or that group or
individual but to the genuinely reflective person-such as one must take oneself
to be if one's philosophizing is to count. A first question about S* is whether
its members are properly basic. There appear to be just two ways for a given
member, m], of S* to be properly basic. Either mj is properly basic by a kind
of self-reference or because it is so determined by some other member, m2, of S*.
For an example of self-referential selection, consider
(3) p's being self-evident is a criterion for its proper basicality for S.

Now (3) seems to be a noncontroversial member of S*. It states a sufficient
condition for proper basicality. Is (3) properly basic? It is hard to imagine a
basis, apart from self-reference, for taking (3) as basic. But no matter. For it
does strike one as self-evident (does it not?) that (3) is properly basic. (Keep in
mind that neither "being self-evident" nor "being properly basic" entail "being
easy to grasp.") So here we have a case of a member of S* being properly basic
by self-reference.
For another sort of example, we might consider
(4) p' s being incorrigible for S is a criterion for its proper basicality for S.

Again, (4) seems to be a noncontroversial member of S*. It states a sufficient
condition for proper basicality. Is (4) properly basic? Since (4) does not report
one's mental state, it is not incorrigible. So here self-reference will not come
into play. It does, however, strike one (does it not?) that (4) is self-evident.
What follows? (4) is properly basic because it is so determined by another
member of S*, namely, (3).
When is it that a member of S* is not itself properly basic? A member of S*
is not properly basic when no member, itself included, of S* would so identify
it. Could this ever be the case? Without an inventory of S*, I cannot be confident
of my answer. But my hunch is that this case does not arise. 17 Were it to arise
for some member, m], of S*, we would need to justify mj as a derived belief.
Succeeding in doing so would not, of course, be the same as showing that
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denying proper basicality to a proposition like, say,

(5) p's reporting what S distinctly perceives is a criterion for its proper
basicality for S.
leads to some kind of absurdity. A reductio of the denial of (5)'s proper basicality
is not a direct proof of (5). On the other hand, were we to accomplish such a
reductio, we would have no need of such a derivation.
Let us provisionally assume, then, that all the members of S* are properly
basic. Can we, lacking an inventory of S*, know whether its members are
necessary truths? Contingent truths? Might S*, perhaps, include both?18
One approach to this question is first to determine whether every member of
S*, if only tacitly, refers to "the reflective person." For since the reflective
person has contingent features, propositions referring to the reflective person
might well be contingent. But, as I have argued, it does appear that the members
of S* must, at least tacitly, refer to the reflective person. Proper basicality, after
all, is a kind of epistemic justification. But justification is a normative concept
that must be understood in terms of what the reflective person believes. Because
of this normative element, then, fully articulated propositions stating criteria for
proper basicality refer to the reflective person. The criterion of self-evidence,
for example, must be keyed to the reflective person, since even self-evident
truths can be overlooked in a casual examination. The criteria of incorrigibility
and of being evident to the senses, for two more examples, presuppose the
reflective capacity to report on one's mental states and physical environment.
At this stage someone might argue that S's "being a reflective person" entails
that S's reliance on self-evidence, incorrigibility, being evident to the senses,
and the like, is successful enough to warrant ascribing proper basicality to the
propositions that meet these criteria. If this entailment holds, then the members
of S*, since they are necessarily keyed to the reflective person, are necessary
truths in virtue ofthe meaning of "being a reflective person." Sometimes, perhaps,
an appeal to the meaning of "being a reflective person" can be used to show
that a member of S* is a necessary truth. But not always.
We might first discuss a case of a criterion for proper basicality and its relation
to being a reflective person where conceptual appeals do seem decisive. Consider
self-evidence. If p is self-evident, in the root sense of being self-warranting,
then p is properly basic for S-if S grasps p's self-evidence. Even if S, a reflective
person, undergoes some radical epistemic change, p keeps its logical property
of "being self-evident." If we suppose, then, that S-whatever the changes
suffered-remains a reflective person and as such grasps p's self-evidence, then,
necessarily, p is properly basic for S. The point is that p retains its own logical
status that enables it to be properly basic for S so long as S can be characterized
as a reflective person. The upshot of this, it seems, is that
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(3) p's being self-evident is a criterion for its proper basicality for S.

already introduced as a member of S*, is itself a necessary truth.
But it is easy enough to find a member of S* that is not a necessary truth,
even given the "essential content" of being a retlective person. Consider again
a (very likely) member of S* that we have already noted.
(5) p's reporting what S distinctly perceives is a criterion for its proper
basicality for S.

Again, S in (5) is the retlective person. Suppose, now, that S suffers a radical
change in perceptual ability while yet remaining a retlective person. (As such S
still embodies a regulative epistemic ideal, once we allow for newly impaired
sensory receptors.) Now S's "distinct perception," while phenomenologically
unchanged, might not be successful enough in determining basic beliefs for (5)
to remain true. What S distinctly perceives might, for example, often prove
illusory. Human perception, as we know it, is largely veridical. But it need not
be so. "Distinct" does not entail "veridical."
What, then, can we say about whether members of S* are necessary or contingent truths? Although we have considered only two cases of S*, we can
conclude that the members of S* are neither exclusively necessary nor exclusively
contingent. This variability rests on the point that it is a contingent fact that
certain faculties enable the retlective person to pick out properly basic beliefs.
Matters could have been quite different.

v
We can, at last, summarize this tentative exploration of proper basicality. Its
starting point is that while we should reject classical foundationalism, the embrace
of broad foundationalism leaves us with some hard questions. I have addressed
three of them here.
The first is just how the strong and natural disposition to accept a belief as
properly basic could contribute to its being so. Neither an evolutionary answer
nor a pragmatic answer suffices. The believer, however, offers an adequate
theological answer. If our dispositional and epistemic structures are God's doing,
the strong and natural disposition to believe p as basic will be intrinsically tied
with p' s proper basicality.
The second question is whether broad foundationalists might make headway
in identifying the criteria of proper basicality by using an inductive approach.
The answer, it turns out, is that there is one important interpretation of inductivism
which they cannot adopt without embracing a disturbing relativism. But such a
relativism, for many foundationalists, is too steep a price to pay. Instead, I
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argued, we must appeal to "the reflective person" to identify the criteria of proper
basicality. Indeed, we should read statements of the criteria for proper basicality
as implicitly referring to the reflective person.
The third and final question addresses the status of the members of S*, the
set of statements that give us the criteria of proper basicality for a reflective
person. Certainly, we saw, some members of S* are themselves properly basic.
Perhaps all of them are. Depending, however, on the proposition, a member of
S* might be a necessary truth or only a contingent truth. The capacities of
reflective persons, after all, could be radically different than they are. That they
are not is, for a broad foundationalist who is also a Christian, an occasion for
prayerful gratitude.
Loyola Marymount University
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